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ABSTRACT 
 
PMK No. 118/2016 provides an opportunity for taxpayers whether or not to participate in 
tax amnesty, to improve compliance. How to report the property that has not been listed, 
both in the statement of wealth and annual tax notification. This phenomenon motivates 
empirical evidence on the role of the accounting firms for the success of tax amnesty in 
financial institutions and banking in Indonesia. The period of this research is done during 
the implementation of tax amnesty policy, 2016. The results show that public accountants 
have an important role in the implementation of tax amnesty policy in Indonesia. Future 
research can observe the same thing in other sectors and test the antecedent and the 
impact tax amnesty. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The government's policy on tax 
amnesty stipulated in the tax amnesty 
number 11 of 2016 adopted on 1 June 
2016 and entered into force on 18 July 
2016. Forgiveness tax is the unearned 
income tax, not subject to 
administration, law criminal taxation by 
revealing the property and paying 
ransom money. Forgiveness. Tax 
collection. Tax collection. The 
government policy of this law on 
forgiveness is an important information 
for stakeholders in decision-making 
decisions. This regulation is an 
opportunity for the company to improve 
its financial performance by following 
the tax forgiveness program. The post 
behind the issuance of amnesty income 
tax law because the revenue has not 
been in finance the state finance. 
The tax forgiveness policy is used 
by many countries to improve state 
revenues from tax sources. Santoso and 
Setiawan (2009) found only a few 
countries that succeeded in the tax 
amnesty program because the 
government does not have structural 
amnesties that include policy, law 
enforcement. The tax amnesty policy 
offered repeatedly in the long run results 
in taxpayer voluntary derivatives and 
cannot rise to the tax base. The success 
of the tax amnesty in South Africa in 
2003 came from the amnesty policy. 
Foreign exchange controls to print 
parked funds abroad at attractive 
amnesty discount rates, besides SARS 
takes a friendly approach to compulsory 
pay in tax-abusive campaign programs. 
Taxes in amnesty are enriched by an 
increase as the number of maintenance 
and the addition to the number of tax 
inspectors and members of the new tax 
law posts amnesty, with threats to 
confiscation of assets and freezing. 
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Amnesty taxes conducted routinely in 
Indonesia proved to be unsuccessful, but 
the amnesty tax conducted in 1997 could 
have succeeded in rising as the program 
was confirmed as the last amnesty 
program and offered amid inflation. 
Ibrahim, et al (2017) concluded the 
application of tax amnesty in 9 countries 
that the success of tax amnesty takes a 
long time. Table 1 shows the frequency, 
time, duration and amount successfully 
collected. Ibrahim, et al (2017) advised 
in advance, in terms of duration, it is not 
recommended to the government to have 
a long-term tax amnesty program as it 
would undermine the government's 
credibility as experienced in Bangladesh 
(Haque, 2013). Secondly, in terms of 
frequency, it is not recommended to the 
government to launch a frequent tax 
amnesty program as in the case of India. 
Forever tax forgiveness will penalize the 
original taxpayer and encourage 
taxpayers to withhold tax payments and 
wait until the same scheme is offered in 
the future. Third, it is recommended that 
the government establish a tax amnesty 
program that is often done so that more 
tax officers get incentives to follow tax 
amnesty as soon as possible. 
 
Table 1.1 Implementation of Tax Amnesty in 9 Countries 
Country Frequency 
of TA 
The Most-
Recent TA 
Duration Amount 
collected 9. 
Bangladesh 18 2013-2014 Two years $2.2 
India 11 2016 Four months $9.8 
Indonesia 4 2016 Nine months $365 
Kazakhstan 3 2014-2016 16 months $17 
Malaysia na 2016 8.5 months Na 
Pakistan na 2016 1 month $0.0004 
Philippines  - 2007-2008 Until March 
2008 
$0.1117 
Sri Lanka 11 2003 Na Na 
Thailand - 2006 2.5 months Na 
Source: Ibrahim, et al (2017) 
 
The enactment of the tax amnesty 
law prompted IAI to issue PSAK 70 
related tax amnesty. PSAK 70 regulates 
accounts affected by the execution of tax 
payables the additional assets. The 
difference between the additional assets 
and liabilities will be recorded as 
additional paid-in capital. Ransom is 
recorded as a tax amnesty charge on 
general expenses in comprehensive 
income. The tax payable which is 
pardoned on the financial position as of 
December 31, 2015, is adjusted to the 
applicable PSAK. The effect is that 
forgiven taxes payable will enter other 
income accounts to increase profits by 
taxes payable. The value will impact the 
corporate tax at the rate of 25% while 
the rate of tax pardon in the period 1 to 3 
only amounted to 2%, 3% and 5%. The 
ability of this analysis requires the 
competence of understanding of 
accounting standards. The role of the 
public accountant is very important 
because, in addition to having inspection 
duties, public accountants also have 
attestation services to consider the 
company. Characteristics of Indonesian 
businessmen who often request external 
considerations (consultants), raises 
research questions, how the role of 
public accountants in the success of tax 
amnesty policies, especially the financial 
sector and banking. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Tax amnesty can be a tool of tax 
policy. Amnesty can also be used 
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systematically as a discriminatory 
mechanism to improve the efficiency or 
even equity within the tax system 
(Marchese, 2014). This can be done if 
the government is committed and 
trustworthy to enforce the tax law. If 
government credibility is lacking, 
amnesty may reduce future tax revenues. 
This condition can occur because, 
psychologically, the tax amnesty is an 
agreement between the government and 
the taxpayer to commit a legal violation. 
This policy may reappear for certain 
interests, for example, for political 
purposes. In the end, a tax amnesty is 
only a policy tool (Bose and Jetter, 
2012). However, through tax amnesty 
policy, the government can detect rogue 
taxpayers, increase income and public 
welfare of the tax sector. 
Amnesty tax can trigger taxpayer 
compliance (Alfiyah and Latifah, 2016; 
Yasa and Mandala, 2016). A different 
finding by Suyanto and Putri (2017) 
proves that taxpayer perceptions about 
tax amnesty policy do not have a 
positive influence on tax compliance, 
and taxpayer motivation has a positive 
influence on tax compliance. 
Yasa and Mandala (2016) said that 
the implementation of tax amnesty has 
implications for several things, such as 
increasing the number of taxpayers, 
increasing state revenues, and helping to 
accelerate the development of 
infrastructure to facilitate the 
community to conduct economic 
activities, thus hoping for prosperity to 
increase. Ragimun (2013) said that the 
application of tax amnesty in Indonesia 
is still a discourse of the pros and cons 
in 2012. Basically, the implementation 
of this policy is expected to increase the 
number of taxpayers, subjects and tax 
objects while increasing state revenues 
from funds in "parking " abroad. 
Compliance and tax evasion are 
complex decisions that are motivated by 
various factors. The existence under the 
threat of punishment, the examination 
for those who do not follow the tax 
policy program (tax amnesty) causes 
thelevel of compliance increases. 
Cummings, et al (2009) and Nar (2015) 
relate it to prospect theory and rank-
dependent expected utility. The theory 
states that people make decisions based 
on the value of potential loss and profit 
rather than the result, and people 
evaluate these losses and benefits by 
using certain heuristic methods. 
Taxpayers will calculate for and loss for 
them if they follow the tax amnesty. 
They will behave as if they will 
calculate the value (utility), based upon 
the potential and probability results of 
each, and then choose an alternative that 
has a higher utility. 
On the other hand, non-participation 
in the tax amnesty program will also 
trigger social sanctions. Cyan, et al 
(2016), Sari and Fidiana (2017) have 
even proven that the level of education 
affects taxpayer compliance. The level 
of understanding is closely related to the 
level of knowledge. Accountants as 
educated citizens should support the 
government's policy. Setyaningsih and 
Oktifitasari (2012) tried to explore the 
opinion of taxpayers. The findings are 
the tax is still a form of disturbance and 
cause fear within the community. 
Taxpayers undertake tax forgiveness 
programs in cooperation with outsiders 
(tax consultants). Public accountants 
have an important role in providing 
consultation. 
Positive results are expected to be 
provided if only a well-designed tax 
amnesty, the practice mentioned above 
is not applied periodically, and the 
losses and incomes that will occur in the 
short and long-term are presented quite 
clearly. Furthermore, it is important to 
apply positive discrimination to reward 
honest taxpayers today. Making tax 
deductions for taxpayers, who pay their 
taxes regularly, may be considered 
"partial justice" in spite of something 
interesting in Tofan's findings (2017), 
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were disciplined taxpayers consider 
themselves unlucky. 
At a different point of view, Bose 
and Jetter (2012) argue that good 
economic conditions may also motivate 
amnesty. If the economy develops 
rapidly thanks to the policies of 
liberalization and the opening up of 
international trade, it may be that 
companies may gain more benefits in 
new environments if they are legal and 
have a clean tax record, since this opens 
the way to access credit markets or for 
listing on stock exchanges and so on. 
For companies that have been operating 
for some time in a hidden economy, 
switching to legality may imply a huge 
cost in terms of sanctions for past 
evasion, and amnesty can reduce the 
wheel of change. The results of amnesty, 
in this case, should be evaluated not 
only concerning the impact on tax 
revenues, but also the impact on GDP 
that must occur thanks to increased 
productivity in companies that can turn 
to legality. 
Indonesia applied the tax amnesty in 
1964, 1984 and 2016. The tax amnesty 
of 1964 and 1984 was deemed 
unsuccessful due to the political 
conditions at the time and the 
government's ignorance of the program. 
This is very different from South Africa, 
India, and Italy that have successfully 
implemented tax amnesty programs 
(Huda and Hernoko, 2017). The 2016 
tax amnesty must succeed, and to do so, 
the government not only abolishes the 
collection rights to taxpayers but also 
raises taxpayers' awareness to increase 
national budget revenues, increase 
taxpayer data, increase foreign exchange 
earnings through incoming foreign 
currency, open investments, creating 
new calls and encouraging tax 
bureaucracy reform. The government 
should also take concrete actions to 
increase tax revenues by conducting a 
national tax census and improving the 
implementation of the Indonesian 
National Single Windows (INSW) 
program.Recurring tax forgiveness is an 
interesting study. Shevlin, et al (2017) 
suggests that repeated tax forgiveness 
programs have increasingly negative 
implications for corporate tax collection. 
Wang and Hsieh (2015) gave another 
consideration, where the people who 
participated in the tax amnesty program 
may not be honestly reporting the total 
amount of taxes spared, it led to the 
avoidance of secondary taxes. Tax 
amnesty can be interpreted as an 
uncertainty of tax evasion penalty. 
Participation in the tax amnesty program 
provides a higher level of utility for a 
tax evader. These results reflect the 
observation that many tax criminals are 
willing to pay taxes even though the 
expected penalty rate and the likelihood 
of being caught avoiding taxes are very 
low. Furthermore, because of the 
avoidance of secondary taxes 
accompanied by tax amnesties, it thus 
shows that during the initial assessment 
period of the tax amnesty plan, tax 
revenues increased drastically, and then 
when the valuation period ended, tax 
revenues steadily declined and 
eventually merged with fixed 
magnitudes. Based on data with a long 
period (1981-2011) Bayer, et al (2015) 
found a trend of taxpayer behavior that 
expects to re-occur tax amnesty. This 
research also proves that the motivation 
of tax amnesty policy by the government 
is dominated by the interest of the state 
revenue target in the short term. 
Taxpayers seem to believe that the need 
for future government tax revenue from 
taxes will have an impact on future tax 
amnesty policies. 
The tax amnesty program in 
Bangladesh has created a detrimental 
effect upon the economy of the State 
(Waris and Latif, 2014) Taxpayers who 
follow the tax amnesty program are 
protected by the government even 
though they only report 1% of their 
black money because they are licensed 
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to whiten some black money. There are 
several loopholes in the scope of the 
violation, the range of predicate offences 
and the types of property covered by 
money laundering. There is also no 
financial sanction available to 
effectively sanction the authorities. The 
current money laundering offences are 
derived from regulations issued in 2008 
by the interim government (2006-2008). 
The current action contains detailed 
definitions of money laundering and 
property and a list of predicate offences 
and sanctions against the violation. 
However, there are some loopholes in 
the physical elements of the violation, 
and the predicate violation range 
remains too narrow. Tax amnesty in 
Italy informally known as a 'scudo fiscal' 
based upon the protection afforded to 
taxpayers who voluntarily disclose or 
repatriate unreported foreign assets has 
resulted in an interesting evolution in the 
assessment of trust for Italian tax 
purposes (Panico, 2010) 
How does the market react to tax 
amnesty policies? The impact of tax 
amnesty events is evidenced by testing 
the market reaction in Indonesia 
conducted by Asmorojati, et al (2017) 
and Wibowo and Darmanto (2017). 
Abnormal return and stock trading 
volume activity before and after the 
enactment of the Amnesty Tax Law on 
LQ-45 companies during the period of 
February 2016-July 2016 decreased. 
And the average volume of trading 
activity (TVA) indicating that 
Indonesian capital market investors do 
not react positively to the incidence of 
tax amnesty (Asmorojati, et al, 2017). 
Different things were found by Wibowo 
and Darmanto (2017), where there was 
an abnormal average increase between 
the date to the event and post-
implementation of tax amnesty and pre-
event and post-tax amnesty 
implementation but on the other hand, 
there was a decrease in average trading 
volume activity TVA), it shows that the 
increase of abnormal return is 
onlypseudo, because it is not 
accompanied by an increase in the 
volume of trading activity, so it can be 
concluded that there is no reaction of 
Indonesian capital market investors to 
the occurrence of tax amnesty. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research is a quantitative 
research. The samples are 44 banks and 
financial institutions listed on 
Indonesian Stock Exchange. Data is 
nominal data. The data source is 
www.idx.co.id shaped. Information on 
the implementation of PSAK 70 in the 
notes to the financial statements, the 
name of the public accounting firm is 
derived from the annual financial 
statements. Big 4 accounting firm in 
question is, EY, KPMG, PWC and DT. 
The test is done by cross-tabulation and 
Cramer-V Test. 
 
4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
This study aims to investigate the 
role of the auditor's reputation on the 
implementation of tax amnesty. The 
Minister of Finance of the Republic of 
Indonesia acknowledges that in the 
number of tax amnesty participants, the 
tax amnesty program has not been 
successful. The main purpose of tax 
amnesty, first, repatriate or attract funds 
of Indonesian citizens who are abroad. 
Secondly, to promote national growth. 
Third, increase the national tax base, 
with the assets submitted in the tax 
forgiveness application can be used for 
future taxation. Tax amnesty to increase 
tax revenues this year. The following 
year a normal rate applies. 
The decision to take tax amnesty is 
based on many considerations. 
Important considerations for firms are 
the benefits, and loss's auditors play an 
important role because they are most 
aware of the company's financial 
condition other than management. The 
research sample is a financial institution 
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and banking company. The 
determination of the criteria for the tax 
amnesty program is based on 
information in the financial statements 
related with the application of PSAK 70 
(tax amnesty) This accounting standard 
regulates the measurement and 
recognition of assets, the difference 
between tax amnesty assets and tax 
amnesty in the entity in additional paid- 
If the information about it is presented, 
then the sample is given the status to the 
tax amnesty program. If the company 
follows the tax amnesty, then they must 
present the difference in the financial 
statements. 
 
Table 4.1 Reputation of Public Accounting Firm and Status of Tax Amnesty at Financial 
Institution and Banking 
Status Non-Big 4 Big 4 Total 
No-Tax Amnesty 8 (18.2%) 18(40.9%) 26 (59.1%) 
Tax Amnesty 8 (18.2%)  10 (22.7%) 18 (40.9%) 
Total 16 (36.4%) 28 (63.6%) 44 (100%) 
    
Companies of major financial and 
banking institutions are audited by Big-
4. There are 14 public accounting firms 
that audit the sector. The results found 
that companies that did not follow the 
tax amnesty, more than those who 
followed the tax amnesty. Further 
investigation is carried out and provides 
evidence that companies not 
participating in the tax amnesty program 
are majority audited by KAP Big-4. 
Consistent with previous findings. 
Further searches found that EY 
contributed greatly to not doing tax 
amnesty compared to other public 
accounting firms because the auditoffice 
that dominated the checks of financial 
institution companies was EY. Of the 16 
clients in 2016 in the sector, only 3 
companies took the role of tax amnesty. 
Based on the data, PWC is a public 
accounting firm that has a role in tax 
amnesty participation. The Directorate 
General of Taxes of the Ministry of 
Finance (DJP) ensures the process of 
examination of tax data for taxpayers 
who have not attended the tax amnesty 
program since the program ended on 
March 31, 2017. Based on the data, the 
Directorate General of Taxation will 
conduct the examination and impose 
fines and tariff in accordance with 
applicable provisions. 
Statistically, the awareness of tax 
amnesty is not supported by the role of 
the auditor based on the observed 
sample. Different roles among 
accounting firms, statistically proved 
significant for the participation of tax 
amnesty programs in Indonesia, 
particularly in the financial and banking 
sector. Cramer-V test results show that 
there is a significant difference between 
the tax amnesty status relationship with 
the auditor. 
 
Table 4.2 Tax Amnesty Status Based on Firm Audits (Total Samples) 
Audit Firms No-Tax Amnesty  Tax Amnesty Total 
Amir-RSM Int 0 (0%) 1 (2.3%) 1 (2.3%) 
Dli-BKR Int 1 (2.3%) 0 (0%) 1 (2.3%) 
Gani-Grant Thorn 0 (0%) 2 (4.5%) 2 (4.5%) 
Hendra-Kreston 2 (4.5%) 1 (2.3%) 3 (6.8%) 
Husni 1 (2.3%) 0 (0%) 1 (2.3%) 
Kanaka-Nexia Int 1 (2.3%) 1 (2.3%) 2 (4.5%) 
Kosasih-Crow Howard 1 (2.3%) 0 (0%) 1 (2.3%) 
Leonard 0 (0%) 1 (2.3%) 1 (2.3%) 
 Proceeding  International Seminar on Accounting  for Society 
Bachelor Degree of Accounting Study Program, Faculty of Economy Universitas Pamulang 
Auditorium Universitas Pamulang, March, 21
st
, 2018 
 
187 
 
Mulyamin-Moore 0 (0%) 1 (2.3%) 1 (2.3%) 
DTT 2 (4.5%) 4 (9.1%) 6 (13.6%) 
EY 13 (29.5%) 3 (6.8%) 16 (36.4%) 
KPMG 2 (4.5%) 0 (0%) 2 (4.5%) 
PWC 1 (2.3%) 4 (9.1%) 5 (11.4%) 
Tjahjadi 2 (4.5%) 0 (0%) 2 (4.5%) 
Total 26 (59.1%) 18 (40.9%) 44 (100%) 
 
Table 4.3 Tax Amnesty Status Based on Firm Audit 
No Audit Firms No Tax Amnesty Tax Amnesty Total 
1 Amir-RSM Int 0 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 
2 Dli-BKR Int 1 (100%) 0 1 (100%) 
3 Gani-Grant Thorn 0 2 (100%) 2 (100%) 
4 Hendra-Kreston 2 (66,7%) 1 (33.3%) 3 (100%) 
5 Husni 1 (100%) 0 1 (100%) 
6 Kanaka-Nexia Int 1 (50%) 1 (50%) 2 (100%) 
7 Kosasih-Crow Howard 1 (100%) 0 1 (100%) 
8 Leonard 0 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 
9 Mulyamin-Moore 0 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 
10 DTT 2(33.35) 4(66.7%) 6(100%) 
11 EY 13(81.35) 3(18.8%) 16(100%) 
12 KPMG 2 (100%) 0 2 (100%) 
13 PWC 1(20%) 4 (80%) 5(100%) 
14 Tjahjadi 2 (100%) 0 2 (100%) 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Several studies have found 
evidence that tax amnesty is a justice to 
injustice. Repeated tax amnesty can lead 
to behavioral aberrations or tax evasion. 
The target of obtaining state revenues in 
the short term by making tax amnesty 
policies as repeatable policies are not 
widely recommended by researchers 
because they can lead to sustainable 
non-compliance. Tax compliance is 
influenced by the knowledge of the 
taxpayer. The behavior of the taxpayer 
from the viewpoint of the prospect's 
theory will tend to be optimizing his 
future utility and not willing to face the 
risk of loss. Law enforcement of tax 
amnesty is very important. Public 
accountants have an important role as 
agents of change that motivate taxpayers 
to abide by taxes. It is suggested that the 
government involves the role of the 
public accountant in conducting the 
examination as a follow-up to the tax 
amnesty policy so that the tax audit task 
is not only done by the auditor from the 
Directorate General of Taxation. Future 
research can be done by conducting 
observations and testing the follow-up of 
sanctions for the non-participation of tax 
amnesty on taxpayer compliance. Future 
research can also further investigate the 
status of tax amnesty policy 
participation in other industry sectors 
beyond the financial and banking 
institutions. 
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